A simple link-formation game is developed to analyze efficiency of construction of network infrastructures, especially road networks, under locally-distributed authorities of network construction decision. In the model, three serially-located local governments (nodes) are eligible to provide its own roads (links) to connect to the neighboring nodes aiming at minimizing the provision cost while satisfying local demand for connection. Inefficiency of equilibrium network provision by distributed authority is clarified. The intervention by central authority with some 'cooperation rule' under which links have to be constructed through some bargaining (cooperation) by the both-end nodes is introduced. Its effects on network efficiency are also analyzed. Population distribution and other conditions that the cooperation rule remedies inefficiency are then clarified.
Introduction
An infrastructure that supports service of network industry is usually provided and owned by one economic agent or institution 1 . This is due to the special characteristic of network industries called 'bottleneck monopoly' where both economies of scale and scope work. Because of these economies the infrastructure is naturally monopolized and the monopolistic power distorts market efficiency. In order to avoid the distortion while keeping the economies, infrastructures of network industries are therefore regulated by 'access charge' or sometimes totally hold by the government. In the case of intercity/interregional road networks that constitute the fundamental of the national economic and social activities, the central authority, namely a central government, owns and manages the construction. Local governments that may consider mainly their own welfare fail to provide socially optimal level of infrastructure due to the ignorance of its effects on other local governments that surely need to use other roads. This shortage of local authorities can be called 'failure of local governments' (for provision of non-local (interregional) infrastructures). It is, however, sometimes argued that decision by the central government is also inefficient due to the 'failure of (central) government'. This failure is caused through the political processes due to information incompleteness, bureaucratic incentives, and resource-distributive interest rather than resource-efficiency interest of political pressure groups. For example, in Japan which currently has a centralized decision system, the highway network that has been constructed by the central agency is now criticized its inefficiency, partly due to this 'failure of government' (for example, construction of very 'fancy' highways with very few users), and under this public pressure a new institutional system is now under consideration by the government; two main changes will be a privatization of construction agencies and localization of construction decisions (with subsidy from central government). Institutional problem of whether the decisional power should be centralized in the central government or localized into states or local governments should be decided carefully by comparing the costs of 'failure of (central) government' and 'failure of local governments'. While there are many arguments and studies focused on the 'failure of government' in literature, the 'failure of local governments' in the aspect of network infrastructure provision has not been discussed systematically. This study tries to analyze the efficient road network infrastructure construction institution by focusing on the distribution of provision power among central and local governments.
Road network infrastructure that connects spatially distant cities/regions provides their residents the possibility of 1) visiting to other cities/regions, and 2) obtaining goods/products from other regions. Namely, the road network such as highways enables moves of 'people' and 'goods'. Among these two fundamental services/functions that the network provides, we concentrate on 'move of people'. Analyses of distributive construction of network infrastructure focusing on the other important function of the network infrastructure, namely flows of goods, are provided elsewhere (Fukuyama and Tamura, 2003) where a regional economics general equilibrium model is employed and is totally different setting from this study.
In this study a simple link formation game is formulated. There are three local governments (that are called as nodes hereafter) with two possible links among them. Each node provides its own links to connect to the adjacent node(s) in order to satisfy local demand for connection to other nodes. Three possible construction scenarios are analyzed, namely, the links are provided by 1) welfare maximizing central government, 2) local governments, and 3) local governments under some coordination rule required by the central government. The scenario 1) is a fictional optimal situation, which is used to check the efficiency of other scenarios. The scenario 2) is totally competitive local government case where they decide whether provide their connecting links non-cooperatively. The final scenario is the partially cooperative local government case where the third party (central government) provides some environment where the multiple local governments can commit to some binding agreement on common link construction by bargaining. The efficiency of provision by local governments is analyzed by comparing the results of these three scenarios.
The Model

Settings
Consider a country consisting of three regions (called 'nodes' hereafter), A, B, and C, on the one-dimensional space. Node i (i ¼ A; B; C) has N i population. Mutually neighboring two nodes have potential to be connected by a link that enables residents in one node to travel to the other. For simplicity, the distances of all links are assumed to be same and denoted by d. This setting is depicted in Figure 1 .
All residents in any node have a constant demand for access to other persons, inelastically. This constant demand for access for each resident is given by the number of persons to be connected, N m , and is hereafter called 'Demand for Connectedness' or 'DFC' in short.
The construction of link between the neighbouring two nodes enables residents in the both nodes to access to mutual residents. Consequently, if N m À N i > 0, there exists excess demand for connectedness within the node and therefore it requires connection to other nodes.
The 'quality' of the link is represented by a single scholar value of . This quality of link can be interpreted as the average moving speed when a person moves on the link. The construction of the link by the node(s) is represented by this quality level of the link. The construction cost function of a link, cðÞ, holds the following properties.
Assume the institution that all the decisions on the quality of links are decentralized to nodes. Each node can, however, take part in deciding the quality of the link only attached to it. Therefore, in our three-node one-dimensional model, the node A (the most left node; see Figure 1 ) considers only one attached link (namely the link between the node A and node B; or the link A-B in short), while the central node of B can think of the constructions of the two links extending to both sides (the links A-B and B-C). Because each link has two connecting nodes, the single decision on the quality of link is to be determined by two nodes. When two nodes are deciding the quality of single link, no binding commitment with side payments is possible.
Residents in a node can use any link. Consequently, if necessary, a resident in the node A, for example, can go to the node C via node B through two links one of which is provided by other two nodes. In economics words in Industrial Organization, there exists positive 'network externality' in link usage among nodes (in a sense that residents who do not live in the nodes that provide the link can use the link). (See, for example, Shy (2001) .) On the other hand, any negative externality related to link usage such as congestion is neglected for simplicity.
Each node contributes to the provision of the adjoining link in order to maximize the utility of the node residents. The utility consists of link provision cost and the time saving value induced by the faster traveling time resulted from better link quality. The utility function is given as follows.
where t l is the leisure (or full) time and w is the value of (or, opportunity cost of) time. 
Demand for connectedness and population distribution
If the node has enough population and the demand of residents for connection to other people is less than the population of the node, they do not need to go out from their own node. So the number of necessary links of each node depends on this DFC level and also population distribution among nodes. Figure 2 gives some example cases on the relationship between the demand and population distributions.
The total population in the system is fixed and is given by N. By this setting of the fixed overall population, the effects of population distribution among nodes on demand for connectedness can be clarified. The population distribution among nodes is best depicted by the 'barycentric coordinates', as shown in Figure 3 where an arbitrary point has three perpendiculars that represent the populations of three respective nodes. Due to the symmetric structure of geography, only the case of N C ! N A (namely, only lower half triangle of Figure 3 ) will be considered without loss of generality.
'Demand for Connectedness' and 'Necessary Node Access'
If the inelastic 'demand for connectedness' to other people is less than the population in the same node of the resident in concern, he or she does not need to visit other nodes (for example, see the node A of [Case 1] in Figure 2 ). However, if the demand is more than the population in the nodes, residents in the node have to go to other nodes to fulfill their demand that requires the use of a link (see the node A of [Case 2] in Figure 2 ). When the demand is further larger they have to even go to the third node (see [Case 4] in Figure 2 where the node A needs to be connected not only to the node B but also to the node C). These relationships between the demand for connectedness and the population distribution are depicted in Figures 4, 5, and 6. The arrows in the figures show the sizes of demand for connectedness N m that are assumed to be universe for everybody in any nodes. In the parentheses of each figure are the numbers of nodes that residents in each node must be connected to fulfill the demand for connectedness or DFC, and are named Necessary Node Access (or NNA in short). The first entry is the NNA for the node A, the second for the node B, and the last for the node C. Generally, more DFC means more NNA. Figure 4 depicts the case of low DFC. Each node can fulfill its own DFC by its own population. In the central area in Figure 4 where population is distributed relatively evenly, all nodes can satisfy their DFC's by themselves, and therefore no node needs access to other nodes (the corresponding NNA is the null vector of ð0; 0; 0Þ).When the node A is relatively small while the other two nodes are relatively large (the area near the bottom of the triangle), only node A which cannot fulfill DFC by itself needs a link, and therefore NNA is ð1; 0; 0Þ. Similar can be applied when B is relatively smaller and other two are both large enough, and we have the NNA of ð0; 1; 0Þ. When both the populations of the nodes A and B are relatively small (namely when population is concentrated on the node C) and the both conditions of N m ! N A and N m ! N B are met, the both nodes of A and B need links, namely, NNA's of ð1; 1; 0Þ. If this population concentration to the node C is extreme so that the further condition of N m ! 1 À N C is met, further (second) link is needed for node(s) A and/or B to fulfill their DFC's, namely the NNA's of fð2; 1; 0Þ; ð2; 2; 0Þg. Attention is needed to this case where two alternative NNA's are possible. This is the situation where the node A with few populations needs to be connected to other two nodes, and also the node B cannot fulfill their residents' DFC by their own population.
(The node C with relatively large population can fulfill its own NFC by its own population). Node B, therefore, has to have a link to other nodes. If the node B has a link to the relatively large node of C, its DFC is fulfilled. In this case the resulting NNA where all nodes fulfill NFS is ð2; 1; 0Þ. However, if the node B has a link to the relatively small node of A, instead of the one to C, the NFS of the B is still not fulfilled. Another link from the node B, namely the link from the node B to the node C is required. In this case, the resulting NNA is given by ð2; 2; 0Þ. Obviously, ð2; 2; 0Þ includes some redundant link. While at this stage of the model specification we cannot exclude this redundant NNA pattern, we can eliminate this possibility when introducing the decision by the nodes explicitly later. nodes need to be connected to another node, and therefore the NNA is ð1; 1; 1Þ. Skewed population distribution (the area near the point C in Figure 5 ) leads to more NNA for other nodes of A and B. Notice that as seen at the low DFC case given in Figure 4 , the area that the two alternative NNA are available also exists in this medium size DFC case of Figure 5 . Figure 6 shows NNA's when the DFC is relatively large in its size. At least two nodes need some links to fulfill their DFC's in any cases. Especially, when the population is excessively dispersed to the two end nodes, all three nodes need to be connected to other two nodes; therefore the NNA is ð2; 2; 2Þ. Notice that as seen at the low and medium DFC cases given in Figures 4 and 5 respectively, the area that the two alternative NNAs are available also exists in this large size DFC case of Figure 6 . Another case of two alternative NNA case is also available in Figure 6 , namely, ð2; 1; 1Þ and ð2; 2; 1Þ. The interpretation of this case is exactly same as in the case of ð2; 1; 0Þ and ð2; 2; 0Þ, but only difference is more NNA for the node C. The pattern of ð2; 2; 1Þ is, again, eliminated as implausible when introducing behaviors of each node (with similar reason of the ð2; 2; 0Þ case mentioned above).
Distributive Network Construction
Non-cooperative construction
Now consider the case where the nodes decide construction levels of their links non-cooperatively. The construction level is the sole decision variable that should be determined by the two nodes at the both ends of the link in concern. This simultaneous non-cooperative game that involves two nodes (two decision makers) over only one decision is modeled as follows; 1) Both end-nodes of the link in concern determine their own payments for the link construction, simultaneously.
2) The third party that is the construction agent provides the link by its technology (cost function) of cðÞ with the total payment from the both end-nodes. The game is played under complete information. The equilibrium construction levels of the link i À j, iÃ ij , are obtained for the two cases depending on the levels of NNAs that the nodes i and j have.
First consider the case when the only one of the both-ends of the potential link in concern has positive NNA. If the link i is necessary link for only one node among the both link-end nodes, the resulting construction level iÃ implemented by the sole contribution by this node is given by
So the necessary and sufficient conditions for this optimization problem are given by
Next, consider the case when the link in concern is the necessary link for both end-nodes of the link. Then the 'best reply correspondence' for a node is to decide the contributing cost level that just realizes its targeting construction level given by maximized objective function of (3). Consequently, when the both end-nodes need the link, the node that has larger iÃ eventually constructs the link, while the other node that has smaller iÃ pays nothing and free-rides the construction 2 .
Non-cooperative construction under the 'cooperation rule'
Consider an upper-level authority that rules every link construction. This central authority can establish the allowance rule that only cooperative construction plans can be allowed for implementation. More precisely, link construction is allowed only when the both-end nodes offer a single construction plan that the both nodes have some positive cost shares. Under this binding rule, some cooperation realizes in the link construction non-cooperative game.
Though for the two nodes to hold the same construction plan they need some 'bargaining', the bargaining process is assumed to be cost-free in this research. When the one side-node needs the link, the resulting construction level is exactly same as the one in non-cooperative game given in the previous section where the node that has willing solely 2 We can formally model this two stage non-cooperative game where the node i maximizes its residents' utility with respect to its construction payment T i :
where the function ðT i þ T j Þ c À1 ðT i þ T j Þ is the reverse function of the cost function of the third party construction agency, cðÞ ¼ T i þ T j . Because of the perfect substitutability of T i and T j (because these are money), and the assumptions on the cost function (c 0 > 0 and c 00 > 0), it can be shown that Nash equilibrium always consists of the full-construction by the larger nodes.
constructs the link by iÃ3 . When the both end-nodes need the link, the resultant construction level determined through some cooperative bargaining process is in the Bargaining Set and therefore it should be efficient (on definition of Bargaining Set including Pareto efficiency mentioned here, see, for example, Chapter 7 of Aumann, (1989)). In this research this efficient construction level by bargaining is given below 4 .
Notice that because of the cooperative construction, the total benefit is the sums of the both nodes' benefits (the first term of the right hand side) while the cost is not doubled but single (the second term of the right hand side).
Non-cooperative construction and 'under cooperation rule' construction
The equilibrium construction levels when the decisions are under non-cooperative situation and also under 'cooperation rule' can be obtained by analyzing the nodes' behaviors described in the preceding sections. The equilibria are categorized into three cases depending on the size of the demand for connectedness N m , namely, when N m N=3, N=3 < N m N=2, or N=2 < N m . Figures 7, 8 , and 9 depict the cases of N m N=3, N=3 < N m N=2, or N=2 < N m , respectively 5 . The construction levels of Link A-B and B-C are shown in the ½Á; Á where the first entry is the one for Link A-B and the latter is for B-C. Equilibrium construction level under the cooperation rule is shown in the box. It can be recognized from the figures that some inefficient areas are improved by the binding cooperation rule. Figure 7 shows the construction levels when DFC is relatively low, namely, N m N=3. The resulting NNA patterns are same between the non-cooperative case and under cooperation rule case. Notice that the NNA pattern of ½2; 2; 0 has disappeared from the resultant NNAs (see the multiple NNA cases with ½2; 1; 0 and ½2; 2; 0 in Figure 4 ). This is because, for the node B NNAs of ½2; 2; 0 is a unilaterally movable from, and also strongly dominated by, ½2; 1; 0. Therefore, ½2; 2; 0 is never chosen by the node B that chooses the node to link strategically. On the other hand, the construction level (the quality of construction, ) is quite different between with and without cooperation rule cases. The construction levels of with-cooperation-rule are given in the 'box' in Figure 7 . As you can see, the difference happens in the area near the point C in the figure where the population distribution is skewed toward the node C. In that 3 Strictly speaking, because every link construction plan should involve positive cost share for both nodes in order to be approved under the 'cooperation rule' by the central authority, the plan with the node that has no wiling for the link is assumed to share a negligibly small part of the link construction cost. 4 The bargaining between two nodes should be modeled more precisely, such as Nash bargaining. However, we are not interested in the cost allocation problem among the bargaining partners. What we need at least for 'efficiency check' in our analyses is one representative Pareto efficient solution from many Pareto efficient Bargaining set (that of cause includes Nash bargaining solution). Subsequently, for simplicity we employ the equation of (5). It is, however, true that cost share becomes a very important factor that determines the coalition cooperation pattern when the node has multiple choices of cooperation partners. In our model, this case realizes for the node B at f½ AB ; C ; ½ A ; BC g in both N=3 < N m N=2 case (which is depicted in Figure 8) and N=2 < N m case (in Figure 9 ). While this coalition formation problem is worth exploring, it needs more suitable modeling to analyze and is beyond our scope of this study. We simply assume that bargainers choose the collation which has a better overall payoff (namely, a better payoff allocation for all partners in the bargaining set) than other coalitions or doing-by-itself case. 5 Each construction pattern corresponding to the different population distribution (namely, the different point in the triangle or barycentric coordinates) and to different level of DFCs (namely, different three patterns of Figures 7, 8 , and 9) was obtained by calculation as specified in the preceding subsections. Due to the space limitation, all calculations are omitted in the paper. Similarly, the detailed calculation for optimal construction levels given later in Figures 10, 11 and 12 are omitted. Detailed calculations will be available from the author upon request.
area, cooperation between the nodes A and B on the link A-B appears. Notice that at these population distribution of cooperative construction by the two nodes, both the non-cooperative equilibria and those under the cooperation rule have 'multiple' equilibria. For example, in the area with multiple non-cooperative equilibria of ½ A ; 0 (where A makes link A-B and B free-rides it) and ½ A ; B (where the nodes A and B construct the links A-B and B-C, respectively, and they use only their own links), you can check that these two are actually Nash where no nodes have incentive of unilateral move. In this area of population distribution, the non-cooperative equilibria under the cooperation rule are also multiple and ½ AB ; 0 (where the nodes A and B cooperatively construct the link A-B), and ½ A ; B . Figure 8 depicts the construction levels when DFC is neither too low nor too high, namely, N=3 < N m N=2. The ½2; 2; 0 of the multiple NNAs has disappeared by the same reason in the case of N m N=3 in Figure 7 . Some bargained constructions under cooperation rule appear in the area near the point C in Figure 8 as similar to the case given in Figure 7 . In Figure 8 , however, even in the area of uniformly distributed population (namely, somewhere in the center of the triangle) cooperation realizes between the one end node (the node A or C) and the central node (the node B). Figure 9 is the case when DFC is high enough (N=2 < N m ) so that at most only one node (the central node B) can self-fulfill the DFC. The two cooperation patterns appeared in the previous two cases of Figures 7 and 8 also appear again here in Figure 9 . Added to these is the possibility that all (two) links are constructed cooperatively. This happens when the central node (node B) is not too big and the two geographically peripheral nodes (the nodes A and C) have population about even (in the barycentric coordinates figures, this is the area between the center of the triangle and mid point of the line segment A-C). In this case, the link between the nodes A and B is constructed cooperatively by the [ nodes A and B, while the link between nodes B and C is constructed cooperatively by the nodes B and C. Overall, we can generally say that when the demand for connectedness in the society is higher, more the strategic behavior including cooperative construction is possible.
Social Optimum
If all residents who need the link contribute to construction of the link cooperatively and all free-riding behaviors are internalized, the social optimum construction level realizes. In this section the optimal link construction pattern is obtained to see the efficiency of the non-cooperative constructions obtained above. Here, we use Benthamite social welfare function as the optimality judgment 6 . When the link is needed by only one end node, the social optimum is achieved by the node in concern by itself non-cooperatively.
Figures 10, 11, and 12 show the social optimum construction levels when 0 < N m N=3, N=3 < N m N=2, and N=2 < N m , respectively. As you can see in the figures, some optimal construction involves cooperation by all three nodes that is indicated by ABC .
'Cooperative Rule' and Efficiency
The equilibrium construction level and the social optimal level are compared for different demand for connectedness that are categorized into three cases of 0 < N m N=3, N=3 < N m N=2, and N=2 < N m , in Figures 13, 14, and 15 , respectively.
When the necessary demand N m is relatively low (Figure 13 ), equilibrium construction level tends to be optimum in most cases. This is due to the fact that in low demand a link tends to be wished by only one node and therefore constructed by this sole eager node. This is especially true when the population distribution is centric (namely, the area near the point B in Figures) . Also when the end nodes, A and C, are relatively same size in population, link construction tends to be efficient due to the same reason above (the area near the bold line in Figure 13 ). Inefficiency due to competition between the two bargaining nodes (A and B) occurs when the sizes of the both nodes are quite small compared to the other node of C. In this case, either of the node (A or B) free-rides the other's sole construction, or, they construct their respective links separately; both of which are inefficient. However, when this population distribution between 'A and B nodes' and 'C node' is extremely skewed toward the point C in the barycentric figures, some end node uses the non-adjoining link and therefore unavoidable 'user externality' occurs at that link. In that case, :optimal achievable non-cooperatively :optimal achievable under 'cooperative rule'
:sub-optimal due to user externality (but improved by cooperation rule)
:sub-optimal due to user externality (no improvement by cooperation rule) the cooperation rule does not help improving the inefficiency of non-cooperation.
Consider the case of Figure 14 . When the populations are nearly equal (namely, near the center of the barycentric triangle), the non-cooperative equilibrium is inefficient and the one under 'cooperative rule' has possibility to be efficient (the reason and effects are similar to the one in Figure 13 ). While when one end node is relatively large in population (namely, near the corner point C in the triangle), even under the cooperative rule the equilibrium is inefficient.
When the demand for connectedness is relatively high (Figure 15 ), non-cooperative construction is inefficient almost all the cases. The cooperation rule improves the non-cooperative situation in many inefficient situations, but still cannot fully achieve efficient construction. As similar to the previous two cases of Figures 13 and 14 , when the population is extremely concentrated in the node C, the cooperation rule has no effect. This is caused, again, by the 'user externality' due to the existence of two-node-trip that causes incompatibility between users and construction cost contributions.
Conclusions
In this research the effects of network infrastructure construction have been analyzed by game theoretic modeling. The problem analyzed in this study is a kind of distributive network/link formation problems. There are many works in distributive network formation in game theory pioneered by Myerson (1978) . However, the model setting in this study is different from these in the following reason; decision by each player (local government) is restricted to its own links, not on the whole links or network. This restriction meets the reality especially when we consider the provision of 'connection' beyond own jurisdiction like roads as analyzed in this study. To the author's knowledge the link-formation game with this restriction is not addressed by any other scholars. Moreover, we show that there is a possibility that the link-formation game with this restriction can be efficient under some coordination, namely, binding cooperation.
The main conclusion of this research is as follows. When the population of the region in the center (among three) in space is large enough, link provision by local governments is efficient. Construction by non-cooperative local governments is not efficient when the population is evenly distributed, especially when the demand for connectedness to other nodes is neither too low nor too high (and therefore the link demand is mutual but the external effect is null). In this case, however, the binding rule of cooperation by the central authority can brings about the optimality. Finally, construction by locals can not be efficient when the largest local government is not in the center (namely, if it is either most-left or most-right node) especially if the demand for connectedness is not too high. This inefficiency is hardly resolved by the cooperative binding rules.
It is shown that localization of network infrastructure provision power to the local governments does not always bring about the better results. Only certain situations (geometrical distribution of populations are not centralized and the needs for link is not too high) is met the localization can be efficient. The model provided in this study is very simple such as assuming inelastic universal demand for meeting and only three-region settings. However, we believe that the general results obtained in the study can also apply to more general cases.
Among others, future extension of the study includes the extension of the model to more general network structures. This may, however, require much fancier model setting with endogenous collation formation. It surly requires some employment of computer simulation which may not provide solid conclusions and policy implications such as given in this study.
